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KEY POINTS
 Measures to achieve micro-level stability may not bring macro-prudential stability.
 In a bust, if regulators should try to reduce official requirements (because macro-
prudential measures should be contra-cyclically expansionary), the market will determine, 
via enhanced risk aversion, much higher requirements.
 The author is in favour of the current extension of central bank powers to achieve greater 
financial stability despite the difficulty in delimiting the boundaries of appropriate central 
bank action and the resulting more complex constitutional position of the central bank.
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Linkages between macro-prudential and 
micro-prudential supervision
In this article, Professor Goodhart highlights some of the failings of the new European 
regulatory regime. He grapples with the questions “what should be done?” and  
“who should do what?”.
WHAT WENT WRONG?
nThe Great Financial Crisis (GFC) taught us to appreciate the analysis developed by 
Hy Minsky (1982, 1988) that macro-economic 
stability did not necessarily entail financial 
stability. Certainly the period 1992–2007 
was characterised as one of macro-economic 
success and stability, and was christened the 
Great Moderation. Nevertheless this successful 
period ended in a major collapse of financial 
imbalances, especially in the housing market 
and banking. Similarly, the Great Depression 
in the US, 1929–1933, followed a period 
of unparalleled success and stability in that 
country during the 1920s; and the lost decades 
in Japan, started in 1992 and continuing, 
also followed a period of extremely successful 
growth and stability in their macro-economy 
during the 1970s and 1980s. As Hy Minsky 
taught, the very fact that the economy seems 
both successful and stable suggests to investors 
in financial markets that risk has declined and 
there is a growing likelihood of ever-increasing 
asset prices. This generates euphoria in financial 
markets, and amongst financial intermediaries, 
notably in banks. Again, because risk appears to 
have declined, the royal route to greater returns 
lies through higher leverage. So stability and 
success in the macro-economy has often the side 
effect of generating unstable speculative booms 
in financial markets, whose subsequent collapse 
then punctures the prior calm in the economy. 
There is, however, also a second lesson, 
which has been less frequently appreciated, 
which is that measures to achieve micro-level 
stability in financial intermediaries and financial 
markets (putting the “house in order”) may not 
similarly entail macro-prudential stability. 
There are several reasons for this point that 
micro-prudential management and supervision 
does not necessarily bring with it macro-stability 
for the system as a whole. Let me take two such 
reasons in particular: 
 Micro-prudential measures are commonly 
designed to require everyone to behave in 
a similar way to those that are generally 
considered to be “the best” of their kind. 
This approach, however, quasi-consciously 
enhances self-similarity, ie that everyone 
will have the same portfolio and act in 
the same manner. Such self-similarity, on 
the “best”, will, indeed, strengthen those 
involved, in particular the banks, against 
idiosyncratic shocks – but, by reducing di-
versity, will actually weaken the system as a 
whole against general systemic shocks. And 
the latter are much more important for the 
economy as a whole. This line of argument 
has been deployed among others by W 
Wagner (2011) and A Persaud (2000). 
 For any individual agent, whether an 
individual investor or a bank, the best way 
to ensure the maintenance of the value of 
their portfolio holdings, assuming that 
they are acting in isolation and with market 
values taken as given, will be to sell their 
holdings of those assets declining in value 
and to buy those assets rising in value. A 
sophisticated form of such behaviour was 
known as portfolio insurance, as developed 
for example by H Leland (1980). Further-
more, the standard method for maintaining 
value, when an investor knows that he does 
not have some special knowledge (as is the 
common case under the Efficient Market 
Hyposthesis (EMH)) is to buy the index. 
Many, perhaps most, passive investors buy 
index-tracking funds, but the problem here 
is that this again is simply another version 
of momentum trading, buying the assets 
rising in value and selling those that are 
declining. The Financial Times ran a study 
on this on 16 August 2015. If enough 
agents are undertaking momentum trading 
simultaneously, then macro-disaster in 
financial markets can easily follow, as in 
October 1987, 2008 etc.
This problem of one-way, momentum, 
trading in financial markets was made much 
worse in 2007–2009 by a run-down of 
own-asset-liquidity in the belief that funding 
liquidity, via borrowing and wholesale markets, 
would always suffice. When these markets 
froze, then there was no alternative to selling 
assets, thereby amplifying the down-turn. 
Had liquidity been much more plentiful, those 
institutions which could see that asset prices had 
been falling through their long-term equilibrium 
could have met any withdrawal of funding 
by investors in themselves by allowing such 
liquidity to run off. Without liquidity, volatility 
in financial markets will get amplified.
In essence, in the period up to 2007, 
most of those operating in financial markets, 
whether as principals, agents, or regulators, 
subscribed to three interrelated myths:
 That macro-stability would entail  
financial stability. 
 That financial stability, in concert with 
adherence to the Basel II Capital  
Adequacy Requirement (CAR), would 
entail assured solvency.
 That Basel II solvency would allow for 
funding liquidity from wholesale markets 
always to be available. 
As became apparent, none of these myths 
was correct. We had macro-stability, but it did 
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not entail financial stability. Although Basel II 
was generally met, not least by failing banks, such 
as Northern Rock, this did not prevent banks 
meeting their CARs from failing. The equity 
requirement under Basel II was both insufficient 
and badly designed. Although virtually all banks 
met their Basel II requirement, other informed 
agents in financial markets could see that their 
solvency was at risk and withdrew funding 
through wholesale markets from them. As 
financial asset prices weakened sharply, it became 
less clear which banks were certainly solvent, 
and many of these wholesale, interbank, markets 
collapsed altogether. 
WHAT SHOULD BE DONE?
Especially following a financial bust, such as the 
Great Financial Crisis (GFC), micro-prudential 
requirements will be greatly reinforced, so 
there is likely to be even more self-similarity. 
Equity ratios needed to be vastly increased, 
and have been so. But the manner in which 
such equity ratios have been raised in Europe 
has been unfortunate. Rather than requiring 
banks to raise additional equity, the authorities 
in Europe have allowed senior bank officials 
to achieve the higher ratios in whichever way 
they thought fit. You can increase the ratio of 
equity to total assets either by increasing equity, 
(the numerator), or by decreasing the total 
amount of assets held (the denominator). With 
equity markets weak, and bank officials and 
their shareholders focussed on their Return on 
Equity (RoE), their preference was to cut down 
the volume of total assets by deleveraging. The 
authorities in each country pressurised their 
own banks to cut assets  
sited abroad, so cross-border banking declined 
dramatically. Such deleveraging has had a severe 
depressing effect on the European economies. 
Furthermore, the equity ratios were defined 
in terms of Risk Weighted Assets (RWAs); 
this may be appropriate at the micro-level, but 
not so much at the macro-level. This has led, 
among other effects, to a massive carry trade 
in government debt by banks, especially in the 
weaker southern European nations, using the 
liquidity provided by the ECB to load up on their 
own government debt. This was encouraged by 
the zero risk weight applied to government debt, 
and has further reinforced the loop between 
the default risk on government finance and on 
the banks in each country (the so-called “doom 
loop”). Similarly, the housing bubble, which 
played such a large role in the GFC, has been 
supported by the politically-induced low-risk 
weight applied to residential mortgages. 
In addition, it was appreciated, at long last, 
that there was a need for requirements, on banks 
and other intermediaries, to hold appropriate 
asset liquidity on their own books. It has been 
argued that central banks can purchase any 
asset, so long as they can assess the appropriate 
price and risk margin on it, so there should be 
no need for banks to hold required categories 
of high quality liquid assets. The problem with 
that position is that central banks may find 
themselves faced with a sudden and urgent need 
to provide liquidity to banks on the basis of 
dubious assets and uncertain solvency. In some 
respects the requirement for banks to hold such 
high quality liquid assets is to provide protection 
to central banks, to give them time to assess 
the position, without being forced almost at 
gunpoint either to bail-out a bank running out 
of liquidity, or force it to close with potential 
serious implications for contagion. Thus, I think 
of the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) as a “be 
kind to central banks” measure. 
Another failing of the new regulatory 
measures is that they should be assessed 
holistically in relation to each other, whereas 
in practice they are generally introduced 
individually. Thus the greater the capital 
strength of a bank, the less need it has for 
liquidity, because its assured solvency will give 
it greater access to wholesale financial markets. 
Equally, the more liquidity a bank has the 
less need it has for capital strength because it 
could meet a run-off of depositors by allowing 
its liquidity to fall. Thus, capital and liquidity 
requirements should be seen as interacting, 
whereas that does not take place in practice. 
During a boom, macro-prudential measures 
may tend to be introduced in a contra-cyclical 
fashion to mitigate the speculative euphoria, 
alongside possibly with tighter micro-prudential 
measures. While this is what should be done, 
in practice the confidence that a boom brings 
with itself leads to macro-prudential measures 
being far less than necessary, and also tends to 
leave people to believe that micro-prudential 
measures are less necessary, because the system 
is more stable. Thus, some of the best macro-
prudential measures that were applied in 
the boom prior to 2007, such as the Spanish 
Dynamic Provisioning System were beneficial, 
but were simply overwhelmed by the scale of 
the subsequent financial disaster. Similarly, the 
belief that we had entered a period of continued 
stability, an end to boom and bust, generally led 
to financial regulation becoming light-touch, in 
pursuit of greater efficiency. So neither macro-
prudential nor micro-prudential measures are 
likely, in practice, to be applied with sufficient 
force in the preceding boom, partly because it 
is very rare when in a boom to recognise that 
it may well collapse. Indeed, if observers did 
appreciate that a boom was unstable and bound 
to collapse, it could not continue. 
While those problems of trying to apply 
sufficiently strong macro-prudential and micro-
prudential measures in a boom are serious, 
and have not been overcome, the problems 
for macro-prudential measures in a bust are 
even greater. In a boom, macro-prudential and 
micro-prudential supervisory incentives work 
together. In a bust, micro-prudential measures 
are bound to be tightened very severely; 
everyone will cry “that must never happen 
again” and will reinforce tough micro-prudential 
measures. In a bust, macro-prudential measures 
should be contra-cyclically expansionary, but 
how could one do that? Even if the regulators 
should try to reduce official requirements, eg on 
margins and capital requirements, the market 
will determine, via enhanced risk aversion, 
much higher requirements. So what can, and 
should, a central bank do to offset a bust? 
It can undertake Lender of Last Resort 
(LOLR) measures to enhance liquidity, but 
against what assets and to which financial 
institutions? If the lending is Last Resort, then 
it signals weakness, and the identification 
of a borrower who needs to apply for such 
LOLR assistance can lead to a contagious run 
from it by other creditors. In other words, 
LOLR identification implies serious stigma. 
Alternatively, and with less danger of stigma, 
the central bank can provide more liquidity by 
swapping more liquid for less liquid assets, as 
was done under the Special Liquidity Scheme 
(SLS) in the UK. Thus commercial banks can 
transform a set of their less liquid assets, eg 
Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBS) for various 
kinds of Treasury Bills. As an extreme version of 
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this, a central bank can engage in Quantitative 
Easing (QE) by buying assets, in return for liquid 
claims on the central bank itself. Finally, the 
central bank can take over from frozen wholesale 
and interbank markets by becoming a market-
maker of last resort, which can be termed, as 
Bernanke called it, credit easing or CE. 
Such extended operational measures take 
the ambit of central bank activities outside their 
normal limits and this raises the question of 
what are, or should be, the limits of central bank 
action in pursuit of financial stability? Indeed, 
macro-prudential measures frequently involve 
measures impacting on institutions outside 
the banking system, and markets outside 
those for public sector debt, such as bringing 
about changes to required loan-to-value ratios 
(LTVs) and loan-to-income ratios (LTIs) 
in housing markets. Some of the measures 
to influence non-bank institutions, such as 
insurance companies and asset managers, and 
additional markets, go beyond the normal 
areas of central bank operation and in some 
cases have fiscal implications. Moreover, such 
actions can involve the central bank both in 
gains and losses which influence the return, in 
the form of seignorage, which the central bank 
may provide to the Treasury and beyond that to 
the general taxpayer. So what involvement and 
conjunction should the central bank have in this 
respect with the government and the wider fiscal 
authority? Does the wider extent of central bank 
actions imperil the maintenance of operational 
independence in their standard monetary 
actions for the maintenance of price stability?
WHO SHOULD DO WHAT?
Central banks have been criticised for failing 
to see, or to prevent, the GFC; though they 
have been properly praised for moving with 
both speed and force to limit and to offset 
the subsequent virulence of the resulting 
financial contagious crisis. Yet they have now 
been given, by governments, a reinforced and 
wider mandate to handle financial stability. 
As a generality, central banks have become 
much more powerful, with a wider range of 
responsibilities, duties, and instruments. Thus 
the ECB has been given responsibility for 
running the Single Supervisory Mechanism 
(SSM) in the Eurozone, and with that the ECB 
is inevitably going to have a major influence 
on the adoption and utilisation of macro-
prudential instruments, though its relationships 
with the European Banking Authority (EBA) 
and the European Systemic Risk Board 
(ESRB) remain to be clarified. Similarly, the 
Bank of England has recovered its role as the 
main micro-prudential supervisor, which it lost 
in 1997, by being given the responsibility for 
running the Prudential Regulation Authority 
(PRA) and runs macro-prudential policy 
through the Financial Policy Committee (FPC). 
Finally, the Federal Reserve System has been 
given the lead responsibility for both micro- 
and macro-prudential management under 
the overall control of the Financial Stability 
Oversight Committee (FSOC). 
This provision of both micro- and macro-
prudential powers to the central bank is not 
a necessity. For example, in Sweden these 
micro- and macro-prudential responsibilities 
have been given to their Financial Stability 
Authority (FSA) rather than to the Riksbank. 
There are a number of complications in trying 
to separate the activities of the central bank 
from that of the micro- and macro-prudential 
authority. In particular, it is widely believed that 
the central bank now should both have, and 
take, responsibility for maintaining financial 
stability. But if it has the responsibility, should it 
not also have the powers, in part through macro-
prudential measures, and the information, via 
its running of the micro-prudential supervisory 
mechanism, to enable it to carry out such 
responsibilities. 
Then again, can any institution but the 
central bank provide essential liquidity? The 
provision of liquidity is the key to the prevention 
of contagious crises. If so, the central bank must 
be at the heart of macro-prudential management 
during a bust. How can that be undertaken by 
any other institution? Moreover, if one is going 
to undertake such measures, one has to have the 
necessary information for doing so, and that can 
only be provided by hands-on micro-prudential 
supervision of the individual institutions. 
Willem Buiter (2014, 2015) has argued 
against the extension of central bank powers, 
and would prefer the Swedish approach, but I 
find it difficult to see how the greater emphasis 
now attached to financial stability can be 
achieved effectively by any other route, except 
by expansion of central banking powers in the 
way that has been commonly done. However, 
this does, indeed, lead to a major problem of 
how, under this new regime, one can delimit 
the boundaries of appropriate central bank 
action, and clarify the constitutional position 
of the central bank under this new system. This 
remains unfinished business. n
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